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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we argue against viewing computer desktop security solely as a technical issue. 
Instead, we propose a perspective that combines three related dimensions: technical 
infrastructure, usability and user engagement. In this light, we suggest that a viable approach 
to desktop security should embrace these three key dimensions of the end-user context. An 
example desktop application is described that has been engineered to embody these 
dimensions in support of the desktop user. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the reasonable view that end-users play a vital role in establishing and maintaining 
desktop security, the major focus of most security texts falls upon technical aspects such as 
perimeter defences, firewalls, intrusion detection, system vulnerabilities, and security exploits. 
Along the way, we commonly meet issues such as malware, public key encryption, privacy 
enhanced email, secure sockets layer and virtual private networks. For instance, such topics 
form the bulk of Bishop’s ‘Computer Security: Art and Science’ [1], which runs to over one 
thousand pages. Notably, Pfleeger’s ‘Security in Computing’ [2], moves straight from an 
introductory chapter entitled ‘Is there a security problem in computing?’ to a second chapter 
entitled ‘Basic Encryption and Decryption’. Encryption engages a further two chapters in 
Pfleeger’s text before we meet malware, operating system issues, database security and 
security in a distributed environment.  
This focus on technical aspects is evident across many publications, whether their 
purpose is reference, education or practice and we can readily understand this focus. Security 
is analogous to health. Many ailments can be cured by use of appropriate remedies but there is 
considerable benefit in adopting preventative measures. The common emphasis on perimeter 
security reasonably identifies the organisation’s boundary as a locus of attack and seeks to 
defend against potential hazards by installing strong defences. Since network-based attacks 
are technical in nature, the defensive measures are accordingly software and hardware based; 
hence, the perceived importance of firewalls, intrusion detection and content filtering. 
Even where the locus of security concern moves from network perimeter to computer 
desktop, we generally find an emphasis upon system configuration and software applications. 
The following advice on security improvement is given by the Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT): ‘Securing desktop workstations should be a significant part of your 
network and information-security strategy because of the sensitive information often stored on 
workstations and their connection to the rest of the networked world. Many security problems 
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can be avoided if the workstations and network are appropriately configured. Default 
hardware and software configurations, however, are set by vendors who tend to emphasize 
features and functions more than security. Since vendors are not aware of your security needs, 
you must configure new workstations to reflect your security requirements and reconfigure 
them as your requirements change’ [3]. 
The application of such advice is evident, for example, in the ‘four basic steps’ to 
desktop security promoted by University College Dublin: (1). Create a strong password for all 
accounts on your computer; (2). Ensure the anti-virus software is loaded onto your machine; 
(3). Accept the Auto Updates from Microsoft or your software supplier; (4). Visit the UCD 
Desktop Security page regularly [4]. Note how these ‘basic steps’ focus on system 
configuration and software updates. 
Such narrow focus is itself risky. The degree of success for any technical solution is 
affected by its installation and subsequent management. These are subject to the reliability and 
understanding of security administrators or end-users. Furthermore, many organisations learn 
to their cost that local users are a greater source of security issues than external threats. While 
clearly critical as determinants of security success, the compliance and performance of local 
users (including administrators) is not a technical consideration. Nor does control of factors 
lend itself to technical solution. 
A final example emphasises the vulnerability of technical measures to user 
perturbation. Individual users may deploy personal firewalls as a desktop protection against 
intrusion and other exploits. In the absence of full comprehension, users are often innocently 
guilty of subverting such security measures. Figure 1 illustrates that a user’s desktop firewall 
facility has been disabled. The firewall was intentionally switched off by the user in order to 
print a document to a local network printer. By default the required network print 
communication was blocked by the personal firewall. After printing, the user re-enabled the 
firewall. Temporary firewall switch off was the user’s remedy to the printing obstacle.  
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Figure 1 Firewall turned off to facilitate local network printing 
 
Most organisations recognise the importance of user participation in security matters and this 
is often reflected in the establishment of company security policies and conditions of use. 
Such non-technical measures aim to engage the social and personal involvement of the local 
user community as a component in network and computer security. 
An over-reliance on technical solutions may lead to a false confidence in local security 
measures, especially if individual users presume that all aspects of security are solely 
addressed at the network level by security administrators. In contrast, we propose that a 
balanced approach to desktop security requires not only software and hardware solutions, but 
needs equal attention to user engagement. Finally, any end-user facilities must be easily 
accommodated by the users themselves. In consequence, this broader perspective embraces 
security from three aspects: (i) technical infrastructure, (ii) usability; and (iii) user 
engagement. We refer to this combination as three-dimensional desktop security. 
 
2. SECURITY DIMENSIONS 
The idea of a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted or multi-layered approach to security is not 
new. Several authors rail against overly narrow views of security requirements, e.g. ‘a one-
dimensional security approach is no longer adequate; today, a multidimensional approach is 
mandatory to control and monitor the ever more-sophisticated network threats’ [5, p. 16] and 
‘traditional piecemeal, single layer, single-dimensional security approaches are no longer 
  
 
 
5
adequate. These approaches can create a false sense of security and create problems as they 
attempt to address’ [6, p. 35]. 
This apparent agreement conceals differences on the nature of the important security 
dimensions, facets or layers. For instance, Avolio (op. cit.) contrasts ‘single-layer, single-
dimensional security’ with multi-layer, single dimensional security’. In his terms, a security 
layer, such as a firewall, affords a protective measure against security threats. Multiple layers 
can be established by embedding further protective measures ‘behind’ the initial layer. For 
example, an internal sub-network may be separated by an additional internal firewall from the 
parent network which is in turn protected by a firewall from the external world. Relative to the 
external world, the sub-network has a multi-layered defences (two firewalls) while the parent 
network has a single layer defence (one firewall). In Avolio’s view, multi-dimensional 
security requires ‘steps in security management, types of security and platforms for 
deployment’ (op. cit., p.18). In turn, these are expanded as follows: 
Security management: planning, policy and procedures. 
Types of security: prevention, detection and response. 
Platform for deployment: perimeter, server, and desktop. 
Given this elaboration of Avolio’s security dimensions we find that for the most part they are 
simply aspects of what we term ‘technical infrastructure’ (taken to include software 
components). The exception to this is his initial security management dimension, which 
embraces planning, policy and procedures. In terms of desktop security, this facet falls under 
our third dimension, user engagement. 
The need for user engagement is apparent when one realises that local users have 
enormous impact on local security issues. Usually, such users have greater privileges than 
external network users and are often the source of security compromises or deliberate security 
breaches. For example, careful password management depends largely upon user commitment 
toward local security concerns. In turn, this is determined by the degree to which users 
understand and approve of security risks and local policies. The extent to which desktop users 
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‘buy in’ to organisational security concerns is a crucial determinant of successful security 
measures.  This is the dimension we term ‘user engagement’ and reflects the importance of 
user comprehension with respect to the risks and implications of their own behaviour.  
To a large degree, this depends upon user education, awareness and sensitivity to 
their role in the institutional security context. This dimension is especially critical at a time 
when many network exploits rely upon ‘social engineering’ as a means of compromising 
computer and network resources (e.g., phishing, Trojans, and worms). 
Our third dimension (usability) is closely allied to user engagement. Given that users 
of desktop computers have (at least) part responsibility for their own security, software 
applications specifically assigned to this purpose must be accessible to the average user. This 
is the requirement described by Zurko & Simon as ‘applying usability to secure systems’ [7, 
p.28]. If computer users are faced with desktop security applications that prove obscure and 
difficult to understand, this becomes an obstacle to optimal use and reduces the prospect of 
user engagement. 
 
3. SELECTING DESKTOP SECURITY COMPONENTS 
To illustrate our view that desktop security should be treated as a three-dimensional issue, we 
offer an example to explicitly address all three dimensions of technical aspects, usability and 
user comprehension. This takes the form of a desktop application that serves as a user 
interface to several existing security software programs. Through selection and analysis of 
existing desktop security programs, we developed a graphical user interface which acts as a 
control panel and integrates a set of commercial and shareware components. This approach 
enabled us to address technical issues in desktop security, by providing the functionality of the 
existing applications, usability issues, by re-engineering a composite user-interface, and the 
user engagement issue, by affording clearer guidance and information on the purpose, 
application and relevance of the security applications.  
The selected software applications were (1) The cleaner; (2) Who’s there?; (3) 
Retrospect Backup; (4) GFI LAN Guard; and (5) X-setup. These particular components were 
selected as a basis for desktop protection from malware (especially, viruses, worms and 
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Trojans), following a series of experiments on a range of potential security applications with 
viruses and simulated malware activity. 
1. The Cleaner 
The Cleaner is a Trojan detector (available from http://www.moosoft.com/products/cleaner/) 
that incorporates two utilities ‘TC Monitor’ and ‘TC Active!’. ‘TC Monitor’ is designed to 
guard Window’s system registry and key system files against malware. (A common ploy of 
malware software is to make changes to system registry so as to start automatically when the 
computer is turned on). TC Monitor allows for manual inspection and configuration of 
registry entries and system folders as a means of providing the user with better means to 
protect data and files. If the computer has many shared folders TC Monitor can be set to guard 
these folders too. In the event of any change affecting the files, folders or registry keys under 
surveillance, the program will generate an alarm to warn the user. 
The second component of ‘The Cleaner’ is ‘TC Active!’ which performs a similar 
role to Windows’ task manager but with increased functionality. This program reveals 
information on processes running on a system. Such information, including loaded dynamic 
linked libraries (DLLs) for each process, may not be useful for the inexperienced user but the 
‘healthy’ state of the system can be outlined and may serve as a comparison against future 
states.  
2. ‘Who’s there?’ 
‘Who’s there?’ is a freeware utility (available at http://www.it-mate.co.uk/) that monitors 
ports on the user’s computer - checking for ports that are passively listening for incoming 
connections. This small component is very effective for revealing the behaviour of ‘unknown 
code’ (potential malware), since worms and Trojans usually open a port to communicate with 
the originator machine or to self-propagate across a network. Such ‘backdoor’ port operation 
is usually conducted without the knowledge of the user but is revealed by ‘Who’s there?’. 
This utility is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Who’s there 
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3. Retrospect Backup 
Retrospect backup is a commercial backup and restore facility (available from 
http://www.dantz.com). This program allows for system roll back in the event of changes or 
damage caused by infected files and enables the user to restore their computer to the most 
recent ‘healthy’ state.  
4. GFI LAN Guard 
LAN Guard is a further commercial component that scans for possible threats, based on 
known vulnerabilities (see http://www.gfi.com/lannetscan/). Remedial actions to cover any 
security holes are also provided by LAN Guard. These include open ports, missing security 
patches, open shares, key registry entries and services/applications active on the computer. if 
used by malicious software. “Trojan Ports” scanning performs the same kind of scan only for 
ports that are known targets of Trojan malware.  
5. X-setup 
This small freeware program provides users the opportunity to make better use of system 
resources and change default settings in order to make their system more effective. This 
component is especially useful when the system registry file is locked by the action of a 
malware program. In this case, via the X-setup wizard, the user can reset the key that prevents 
access to the registry editor. 
 
4. A DESKTOP SECURITY SANDBOX 
In developing our three-dimensional desktop security application we aimed to unify all the 
components under one control panel which would also afford extra user functionality. Since 
our concern lay with protection against malware, we conceived our application as a ‘Sandbox’ 
facility that would afford testing of potentially suspect code (malware) in a recoverable 
setting. 
The individual software components described above each have a contribution to 
make toward malware protection, detection or recovery. The Sandbox application builds upon 
these features to afford our three dimensions of desktop security. Through the single interface 
of the Sandbox application, the user can start individual components as required for specific 
tasks. Since the differing software components address different conditions, each can be 
separately co-ordinated via the Sandbox interface. Thereby, Retrospect back-up need not be 
open at the same time as ‘TC Monitor’ or ‘Who’s There?’.  
For appropriate operation, the users must have an adequate understanding of the 
services offered by each component application. The Sandbox interface aims to assist in this 
by structuring its information to reflect the interplay of these components. The Sandbox 
control panel does not make direct calls to any of the module’s APIs but only to the Windows 
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API in order to indirectly start the applications. Each software module retains its own controls. 
The Sandbox assists the user by maintaining a record of when each application was last 
deployed.  
The grouping of control buttons on the Sandbox interface assist users in 
understanding the purpose and relationship of each component. ‘The Cleaner’ components 
form one group followed by ‘Who’s There?’, the back-up and LAN Guard elements. Since the 
Sandbox aims both to protect and enlighten the user on malware issues we provide a set of 
port control buttons, to permit easy simulation of worm activity, while a fourth group of 
buttons affords access to our malware simulations. Figure 3 illustrates the Sandbox control 
panel. 
 
Figure 3: The Sandbox Control panel 
 
The button that invokes X-setup is separate to reflect that its operational role is distinct from 
the other components. This feature is invoked only in the event that malware prevents the user 
from running the registry editor. 
The homogeneous user interface afforded by the Sandbox application aids users in 
component selection and also shows a timestamp for the last run of each component. In the 
Sandbox tracking of component operation, a critical period has been set at thirty days. If thirty 
days have elapsed since a component was invoked, a warning message appears next to the 
corresponding button (displaying the word ‘CAUTION!!’). To add functionality and usability 
(to encourage correct usage of the software components), the button groups are positioned to 
reflect which programs are called first, second and so on.  
The Sandbox control panel and its utilities integrate and enhance the stand-alone 
functionality of the individual components. A package containing the separate applications, 
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without an appropriate controlling module would place considerably greater burden on the 
user. The utility and convenience of the individual applications is boosted and their role 
becomes clearer as stand alone modules as well as parts of an integrated security solution.  
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, our emphasis lies with desktop security. We elaborate the requirements for such 
security and describe a sample desktop application that seeks to embody our critical three-
dimensions. Network or organisational security are larger issues and plausibly merit further 
dimensions to achieve adequate measures. Our concentration on the desktop limits security 
considerations to aspects within the remit and control of the end-user. Thereby, usability and 
user engagement match the importance of technical infrastructure as a basis for desktop 
security. This leads us to view desktop security as a three-dimensional issue encapsulating 
technical infrastructure, usability and user engagement. Our Sandbox application exhibits 
these three dimensions by affording a set of technical components, enhanced usability and 
greater user engagement. 
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